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Lampung, Indonesia where soil erosion has broad 
implications for both on-site and off-site environmental 
damage.  The strategy to engage farmers in environmental 
protection initiative is through the Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) scheme. 
 
A key condition of PES is transparency regarding the 
conditions under which incentives or rewards can be 
granted.  Balanced information and the power of transaction 
are the basis for any environmental service (ES).  A contract 
procurement auction is an alternative mechanism for 
extracting information from ES providers on levels of 
payments or incentives that will cover their costs when 
joining a conservation program.  This study tested the 
application of a procurement auction method to reveal 
hidden information on the opportunity costs of supplying 
environmental services. 
 
The results show that a seal-bid, multiple round second–
price Vickrey auction with a uniform price can be applied 
where most of the auction participants have a low education 
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market-based competitiveness is not common. It reveals too 
that farmers’ bids to be involved in conservation contracts is 
more dependent on their learning process during the auction 
than observable factors such as their socioeconomic 
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capital state.  Finally, it shows that introducing procurement 
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does not harm their social relationships and is an applicable 
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The setting of this study is a watershed area in Lampung, Indonesia, where soil erosion has 
broad implications for both on-site and off-site environmental damage. 
Payment for environmental services (PES) is a conditional and voluntary policy option that, in 
this study, provides incentives for maintaining watershed functions. A key condition of PES is 
transparency regarding the conditions under which incentives or rewards can be granted. Balanced 
information and the power of transaction are the basis for any environmental service (ES). A contract 
procurement auction is an alternative mechanism for extracting information from ES providers on 
levels of payments or incentives that will cover their costs when joining a conservation program. In this 
paper we focus on designing a procurement auction method to reveal hidden information on the 
opportunity costs of supplying environmental services. This is an initial application of a procurement 
auction method in a rural setting in a developing country. Our study resulted in a set of auction rules for 
determining how limited watershed rehabilitation funds could be allocated. We examined the 
applicability of such an auction design in an Indonesian rural setting by testing: (1) auction design 
factors, such as: participants‘ understanding of auction rules, the ease-of-use of these rules, the 
appropriateness of the participants‘ bid offered during the auction, and the fairness of the auction 
process; (2) social factors, such as: impact on relationship between contracted and non-contracted 
farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information exchange amongst 
farmers; (3) environmental factors, such as: awareness of soil and water conservation and the rate of 
contract completion. Our results show that a sealed-bid, multiple round, second-price Vickrey auction 
with a uniform price can be applied where most of the auction participants have a low education level, 
low asset endowment, small plot size, and where market-based competitiveness is not common. Our 
finding is that farmers‘ bids to be involved in conservation contracts is more dependent on their 
learning process during the auction than observable factors such as their socioeconomic background, 
their awareness of conservation, and their social capital state. It was also found that introducing 
procurement auction as a market-based approach to rural communities does not harm their social 
relationships and is an applicable method in a rural setting. Nevertheless, this learning process does not 
guarantee the successful accomplishment of a conservation contract. The rate of contract 
accomplishment was moderate and this may be influenced by many other factors such as the farmer 
groups‘ leadership and their institutional arrangements for conducting conservation activities. The 
implication of these findings is that designing a proper conservation auction method and estimating the 






1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Research Problems 
A payment for environmental services (PES) is one example of a conservation approach that 
provides incentives for maintaining the functions of a watershed. The central principles of this 
approach are that those who provide environmental services (ES) or the ES providers should be 
rewarded for doing so, and that those who receive the services should pay for their provision based on 
the performance in enhancing ES (Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Pagiola and Platais, 2002). 
Compared to previous conservation approaches, the approach‘s main innovation is the conditionality or 
the transparency of conditions wherein incentives or rewards can be granted (van Noordwijk et al., 
2008) (Wunder, 2005; van Noordwijk et al 2008). As a consequence of this conditionality, PES 
requires voluntary contractual relationships between ES providers or farmers as land managers1 and ES 
buyers.   
The conditionality of the PES requires transparent information and a balanced power of 
transaction as the basis of any ES contracts to ensure fairness and effectiveness. Information 
asymmetry exists when one actor has more or better information than the other on their benefits in 
being involved in the PES scheme. Two important information asymmetries in the design of PES 
contracts are hidden information or lack of information while negotiating a contract and hidden action 
or lack of information about the performance of the agreed contract or lack of ability to retaliate for a 
breach of an agreement (Ferraro, 2004; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
Hidden information (adverse selection) that often occurs in designing and negotiating a PES 
scheme is the lack of information on the opportunity costs of supplying environmental services (Ferraro 
2008). The amount of incentive required by farmers to change their behaviors to enhance 
environmental services is private information. If the incentive is too low, it will not motivate ES 
providers to improve their land-use practices and provision of ES. If the incentive is too high, the PES 
will fail to provide environmental services effectively from a given budget.  
A PES contract procurement auction is an alternative policy mechanism to extract from ES 
providers the information on level of payments or incentives that at least cover all their costs in joining 
a conservation program (Ferraro, 2004; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005). It is defined as ―a 
process through which a buyer of environmental services invites bids (tenders) from suppliers of 
environmental services for a specified contract and then buys the contracts with the lowest bids‖ 
(Ferraro 2008).  
                                                 
 
1 In our context, we denote farmers as environmental service suppliers since they have a role in maintaining the environmental 
benefits from the watershed. Their decisions on land use practices influence the provision of environmental services (ES) from this 
landscape, including clean water, high biodiversity and the beauty of the landscape. 
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Procurement auctions on conservation contracts have been successfully implemented in the 
United States, Australia and Europe (Stoneham et al., 2003). The award of contracts on the basis of 
competitive bidding is a method frequently used in procuring commodities for which there are no well-
established markets (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Ferraro, 2008), such as in markets 
for environmental services.  
In this paper, we focus on designing a procurement auction method to reveal hidden 
information on the opportunity costs of supplying environmental services. This is the first application 
of procurement auction method in a rural setting of a developing country, where most of the auction 
participants have a low education level (less than seven years of education), low asset endowment, 
small plot size (most owned land of less than 0.5 hectares) and where market-based competitiveness is 
not so common. Our study resulted in a set of auction rules for determining how a limited budget from 
the watershed rehabilitation fund could be allocated. We observed if the socioeconomic backgrounds of 
the participants influenced the submission of the final bids and analyzed the validity of applying this 
auction design in a rural setting in Indonesia by testing some other factors. These factors were (1) 
auction design factors, such as: participants‘ understanding of auction rules, the ease-of-use of these 
rules, the appropriateness of the participants‘ bid offered during the auction, and the fairness of the 
auction process; (2) social factors, such as: impact on the relationship between contracted and non-
contracted farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information 
exchange amongst farmers; (3) environmental factors, such as: awareness of soil and water 
conservation and the rate of contract completion.  
The setting of this study was a watershed area in Lampung, Indonesia, where soil erosion has 
broad implications for on-site and off-site damage.  The most direct on-site effect is the loss of topsoil 
from the coffee farmlands that dominate the watershed, resulting in low agricultural productivity in the 
long term. Off-site effects include siltation, water flow irregularities, a reduction in irrigation, water 
pollution and agrochemical run-off. The soil sediment can reduce the capacity of a reservoir located 
downstream of the watershed, adversely affecting irrigated agriculture and hydro-electricity generation 
(Sihite, 2001; Ananda and Herath, 2003). 
 
1.2 Financing and Enhancing Environmental Services   
A wide range of innovative mechanisms has been developed for financing conservation in 
recent years.  These have attempted both to access new sources of revenue for conservation and to 
develop new mechanisms for utilizing any available funds. Receiving considerable attention as a new 
way of approaching conservation is the payments for environmental services (PES) approach. This 
initiative has been applied globally, especially for the conservation of biodiversity, with regard to the 
conservation and maintenance of watershed functions, for carbon sequestration, and in order to protect 
the beauty of the landscape. 
At the beginning of its concept development, the PES was defined as a voluntary transaction 
where a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) was being bought by a (minimum 
of one) ES buyer from a (minimum of one) ES provider, if and only if the ES provider secures ES 
provision (conditionality) (Wunder 2005). In principle, those who provide environmental services 
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should be compensated for doing so and those who receive the services should pay for their provision 
(Pagiola and Platais 2002). In other words, a payment by the ES beneficiaries can help make the 
conservation more attractive for land users. To change their behavior, the payment must obviously be 
more than the additional benefit which land users can gain from alternative land use and less than the 
value of the benefit which the downstream populations are willing to pay. Additional sources of income 
for poor land users that could augment their livelihood were assumed to be advantages of this scheme. 
1.3 Experimental Auction  
Experimental auction methods are becoming more commonplace in non-market valuation 
because of their perceived benefits relative to previously used contingent valuation survey methods.  
The reason is that participants have more incentives to reveal their true value for a product compared to 
a hypothetical survey setting.  In this case, real products and real money are exchanged in an 
experimental setting (Lusk et al., 2004).  The mechanism is particularly useful in low-income countries 
where markets are imperfect and households can behave in ways very different from profit 
maximization (Ferraro, 2004).   
Four auctions are commonly used in the literature that can theoretically reveal any private 
information asked for (or incentive compatible): the English auctions, second price (Vickrey auction), 
Becker-DeGroot-&-Marschak (BDM) and random n-th price auctions. The structure of each 
mechanism is outlined in Table 1 (Lusk et al., 2004).  The most widely recognized and straightforward 
method is the English auction.  In an English auction, the experimenter opens the auction at a relatively 
high price and begins running down in fixed increments.  Depending upon the setup of the auction, 
participants either offer descending bids or signal their willingness to stay in the auction as prices are 
decreased over time.  The auction ends when only one participant is willing to accept the current price.  
This participant wins the contract, and s/he is paid.   
The other three types of auctions, namely: second price, BDM and random n-th price auctions 
basically modify the one-shot, sealed offer auction wherein each participant independently fills out and 
submits an offer-submission card that specifies the per-hectare price proposed to join the program.  In a 
second price auction, the individual with the lowest bid wins the auction and is paid the second lowest 
bid amount for joining the program.  The BDM mechanism induces individuals to truthfully reveal 
certainty equivalents for lotteries. In the BDM elicitation procedures, a random number or price is 
drawn from a pre-specified distribution.  Individuals with bids lesser than the randomly drawn price 
‗win‘ the auction and are given the contracts at the randomly drawn price.  The random n-th price 
auction introduced by Shogren et al. (2001) combines elements of two classic demand-revealing 
mechanisms – the second price and the BDM mechanism.  The random-n-th-price auction works as 
follows: each bidder submits a bid, each bid is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  A random number 
uniformly-distributed between 2 and k (k bidders) is selected. Each of the (n-1) lowest bidders wins the 
contract at the n-th price.  
The three auctions above give participants incentives to tell the truth because each auction 
separates what they say from what they are paid. Sincere bidding is the weakly dominant strategy.  In 
examining the effects of varying numbers of bidders, more aggressive bidding happens in first price 
auction, while this treatment has essentially no impact on bidding in second-price auction and results in 
lower bids in third-price auctions (Kagel, 1995).  Shogren et al. (2001) concluded that second-price 
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auction does a reasonable job on aggregate but falls short at the individual level.  Comparison of the 
random n-th price auction to the second-price auction showed that the second-price auction works 
better on-margin, and the random n-th price auction works better off-margin.   
Lusk et al. (2004) investigated the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates 
from experimental auctions.  They conducted multiple bidding rounds for the second-price and the 
random n-th price auctions because market prices are endogenously determined and subjects could 
incorporate market feedback into their valuations. On the other hand, in the BDM mechanism, market 
prices are exogenously determined, and as such, subjects receive no meaningful feedback from 
additional rounds. They found that the choice of auction institution significantly (both statistically and 
economically) influenced bids.  Results indicated that the second price auction generated higher 
valuations than English, BDM, and random n-th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and 
that the random n-th price auction yielded lower valuations than the English and BDM auctions.       
Table 1. Incentive Compatible Auction2 
 Auction Institution 






submit sealed bids 
Simultaneously 
submit sealed bids 
Simultaneously 
submit sealed bids 
Winning bidder Participant who 
offers the last bid 
Participant with 
highest (or lowest) 
bid 
All participants with 
bid greater  (or 
lesser) than a 
randomly drawn 
price 
All participants with 
bid greater (or 
lesser) than a 
randomly (n-th) bid 
Number of winners 1 1 0 to all participants n-1 
Market feedback? Yes, with multiple 
rounds 
Yes, with multiple 
rounds 
Yes No 




n-th highest (or 
lowest) bid  
  
1.4 Designing a PES Procurement Auction in Developing Countries: Some Considerations   
A sealed-bid auction maintains anonymity. In a developing country where village leaders and 
elders have significant roles and dominance in decision-making, a sealed-bid auction is considered 
more appropriate compared to an English or Dutch auction (Ferraro, 2004). A second price auction is 
also relatively easily to explain and to be understood by participants, making the bidding process more 
transparent.  
In procurement auctions, the reserve price is the maximum acceptable bid3. The announcement 
of a reserve price can influence the bidding decision and hide the bidders‘ true value. However, the 
                                                 
 
2 Modified from Lusk et al. (2004) 
3 Shor, Mikhael, ―Reserve Price‖ Dictionary of Game Theory Terms, Game Theory .net, 
<http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/ url_of_entry.html> Web accessed: June 06, 2008 
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bidders also can implicitly interpret the information revealed by winning bids as reserve prices in 
multiple round auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005). 
Two pricing mechanisms in auctions are uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. When 
more than one product is available in an auction, the auction may have multiple winners with different 
winning bid values. With uniform pricing at a procurement auction, all winners are paid the price 
offered by the winner with the lowest winning bid. For discriminatory pricing, all the winners are paid 
their exact bid amounts.  
Alix-Garcia et al. (2003) showed that uniform pricing may be more equitable while 
discriminatory pricing is more cost-effective.  A complete list of possible implications for each pricing 
rule is listed in Table 2.  Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005) showed that under uniform pricing a 
bidder‘s bid only determines the chance of winning but not the payment received. It was assumed that 
the bidders‘ dominant strategy thus is to bid their true opportunity costs.  
 
Table 2. Comparison between Two Pricing Rules: uniform and discriminative 
Element Uniform Discriminative Description 
Bidding strategy  + - Under discriminatory pricing, ES seller‘s bid 
determines both chance of winning and price 
to be received for selected activities 
Under uniform pricing, ES sellers‘ bid only 
determines chance of winning, so it reveals 
WTA more accurately 




Uniform pricing requires relatively more 
simple administration when dealing with 
many ES sellers  
Fairness + - ES sellers in discriminative pricing earn no 
profits if they submit offers equal to their 
opportunity costs 
Political interest - + High opportunity cost farmers can be 
disappointed when uniform pricing is 
applied 
Efficiency of ES buyer - + ES buyers might achieve environmental 
objective at least cost (McKee and Berrens 
2001; Cason and Gangadharan 2005) 
For ES sellers, since conservation payment 
is a non-stochastic income, it would lower 
their income uncertainty (Riley and 
Samuelson 1981) 




Risk-averse participants inflate their bids 
under discriminative pricing 




Over bidding will increase expenditure 





2.1 Setting of Study Site 
Sumberjaya (which means ‗source of wealth‘) is a sub-district of the mountain range of Bukit 
Barisan in Lampung Province, Indonesia. It covers 55,000 ha and shares a boundary with the Way 
Besai River‘s upper watershed, which sits at between 720 and 1,900 m above sea level. This area had a 
population of about 82,453 people in 2003, giving a population density of about 150 persons/km2. 
About 40 percent of the sub district is classified as protected forest and about 10 percent as National 
Park. Nevertheless, about 70 percent of the area is now covered by coffee gardens.  
The majority of the communities in the Way Besai upper watershed make their living by 
planting coffee in the hilly regions (44.61 percent of the area) and planting paddy rice along the valley 
bottoms (5.13 percent of the area).  Two types of coffee-cultivation – coffee-monoculture and coffee-
multistrata (or coffee agroforestry) – cover 20.12 percent and 24.49 percent of the watershed area, 
respectively.   
The communities in the upper sub-watersheds and in the riparian zone of the river are the ones 
that decide land use, and they can affect the quality and quantity of hydrological services of the sub-
watershed.  The preliminary results of the Alternative to Slash and Burn (ASB) studies done by the 
International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) over the past six years suggest that coffee-
agroforestry can be as effective as the original forest cover in protecting watershed functions related to 
water yield and water quality (van Noordwijk et al., 2000).  Research findings have consistently shown 
that planting fodder grass under intensive annual upland crops and other conservation measures 
effectively reduces erosion (Agus, 2005).  In coffee plantations, soil loss was very high on plots that 
did not employ any conservation efforts, especially in the first two years after coffee planting.  During 
this period conservation practices such as using bench terraces and hedgerows effectively reduced 
erosion.     
Many farmers using coffee-monoculture systems do not apply soil conservation techniques, and 
this may cause high soil erosion.  Some research has confirmed that the land covered with young coffee 
trees (less than three years old) and the early stages of paddy fields along the riverbank are prone to 
high erosion. Potential conflicts over water resources can happen in such situations.  During the dry 
season the supply of water is often not sufficient to satisfy demand and in some areas of the sub-
watershed the sediment load in the water seems unacceptably high to some downstream users, 
especially the hydropower company located downstream in the watershed.  The other potential problem 
is the decreasing quality of water, caused by domestic waste and chemical fertilizers. 
Observations on river discharge and sediment load (erosion hot-spots) in the Way Besai and its 
main sub-catchments are ongoing4.  ICRAF research selected the 11 largest sub-catchments and nine 
                                                 
 
4 A field report. The Second Observation: Assessment of Discharge and Sediment Load in the Way Besai and its Main 
Subcatchments, Bruno Verbist, Susanto, Pratiknyo Purnomo Sidhi, Endri Subagyo, Dede. 
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measuring points along the Way Besai.  The sampling points were located on bridges on roads along 
the river. A water-quality monitoring group of 21 people was formed to collect data daily. 
Collective actions, classified as societal-based, and formal collective actions already exist in 
Sumberjaya (Arifin, 2004).  The existing societal-based collective actions are: gotong-royong (labor 
sharing on common property); arisan (periodical capital sharing on a regular basis), and kelompok tani 
(farmer groups sharing information to obtain land tenure).  A formal watershed community forum was 
established in January 2004 and has been endorsed by local government as a collective method of 
conserving natural resources.  
Since 2002, the Way Besai Hydroelectric Power Plant (HEP) has implemented programs of land 
rehabilitation and reforestation by empowering local people. During the first year, the focus was on 
establishing HEP‘s jurisdiction for land rehabilitation. The power plant provided tree seedlings and lumber 
and polybags for this purpose.  The HEP has claimed that it has contributed as much as Rp 80 million in 
four years to the land rehabilitation program and to the enhancement of the livelihoods of the people living 
around the power plant. These livelihood enhancements have included scholarships for students, 
contributions to charities on religious occasions, and the rehabilitation of mosques and schools. 
The legal basis of this scheme was the letter of the Ministry of State-owned Company Affairs 
about the Corporate Social Responsibility Partnership Program, number KEP-236/MBU/2003. This 
letter cites that 1 percent of the net-benefit of state-owned companies should be allocated for 
developing environmental programs with communities. This scheme involving government public 
investment is a potential mechanism for reward transfers in the near future. 
2.2 Research methods 
The research consisted of several preparatory steps before the procurement auction was 
conducted (Figure 1). Firstly, we identified the sample population and potential auction participants at 
the sub-watershed level. Secondly, we designed the conservation contract that would be offered in the 
auction. In designing the contract, some basic information was needed such as: What problems would 
be solved by the conservation project?  Do local farmers have any knowledge that can help to solve 
watershed problems? What are these conservation techniques? What are the farmers‘ preferences for 
terms of payment? When should the contract begin? Thirdly, we tested and selected some elements of 
the auctions through two types of experiments: a laboratory auction experiment with students and field 
framed experiments with farmers5. The final step of the research was to conduct a natural field 




5 This taxonomy of field experiments proposed by Harrison and List (2004) differentiated between field experiments from 
conventional lab experiments:  
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experiment and to monitor the success and completion rate of the contract by farmers who won the 
auction for one year.    
 
 
Figure 1. Flow of the Research Steps  
2.2.1 Identifying Potential ES Providers and Auction Participants   
The research team conducted a series of rapid surveys of the socioeconomic profiles of potential 
auction participants. These surveys took place at five hamlets in three sub-watersheds of Sumberjaya – 
Way Lirikan, Way Ringkih and Air Hitam – all of which have high erosion rates. The key informant 
interviews resulted in 13 variables. Variables included the name of the farmer, ethnicity, age, main 
occupation, house location, status of land management (self-owned and managed; self-owned but 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
A conventional lab experiment is ―one that employs a standard subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and an imposed set 
of rules‖; 
A framed field experiment is an experiment that ―employs a nonstandard subject pool with field context in either the 
commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use‖; 
A natural field experiment is ―the same as a framed field experiment but where the environment is one where the subjects 
naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment‖  
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rented, etc.), area of land in hectares, land cover, land status (private, state-owned through social 
forestry program), existence of land conservation and its type, and involvement in farmer groups.  
2.2.2 Capturing Watershed Problems and Local Management Options  
The research team conducted a participatory landscape assessment (PALA) in two sub-
watersheds: Way Ringkih and Way Lirikan. The PALA is an important part of Integrated Participatory 
Conservation Planning at watershed level, and it is designed through some rapid rural appraisal tools 
and some participatory rural appraisal tools (Fagerstrom et al., 2005). In this case, the field team 
conducted a series of field visits or ‗transect walks‘ across the sub-watersheds, followed by similar 
activities conducted together with local farmers. The key informants shared their opinions on local 
knowledge and their experiences of watershed management via non-structured interviews. 
The objective of a PALA is to capture local knowledge on temporal and spatial scales, 
specifically the assessment aims to study farmers‘ perceptions of watershed problems such as erosion, 
flooding and landslides, and to understand farmers‘ management options and their actual choices as a 
way of helping them to develop land management plans. Information on farmers‘ knowledge of 
watershed problems and their management options to solve these problems is useful to the conservation 
agent or auctioneer developing conservation contracts. A conservation contract that accommodates the 
most doable and familiar conservation techniques for farmers will enjoy greater effectiveness and a 
higher performance.  
A series of focus group discussions (FGDs) followed the field visits. The research team 
facilitated four FGDs involving 76 coffee farmers from three selected hamlets. The purpose of these 
FGDs was to explore perceived problems in managing land and practicing conservation techniques, 
including the types and causes of problems and efforts to avoid the problems. Meetings began with a 
brief introduction to the objectives of the research project and its activities. During the discussions 
participants were divided into three smaller groups to encourage opinion sharing. 
2.2.3 Balancing Knowledge of Conservation Techniques: Capacity Building and Designing 
Conservation Contracts 
Most of the farmers were familiar with and could mention some local conservation techniques. 
However, because of varied perceptions of the techniques‘ applications in the field, the research team 
conducted cross visits and field training. At this stage, the participants were not informed that they 
might have to participate in an auction. 
In the three hamlets, the field facilitators conducted three cross visits involving 77 farmers and 
field training for 82 farmers. For the cross visits, the farmers visited two farmers in another village (Tri 
Budi Sukur village) who have been practicing soil conservation techniques. A local government field 
extension officer facilitated this process.  
During the first cross visit techniques in constructing combined terrace and ridging were 
introduced. During the second session the application of natural vegetative strips or grass-strips was 
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presented. The discussion topics of both sessions were on how to maintain these techniques and their 
costs. Some brief presentations about soil and water conservation followed these activities.  
The field training had two sessions: theory and field practice. The resource person explained 
soil conservation techniques in the field. These techniques included terracing, ridging, making a 
sedimentation pit, and bench terracing. The field extension officer also showed farmers how to measure 
the field contour using a simple tool.   
The farmers practiced these techniques at the nearby coffee field after the discussion. There 
were three groups of farmers, each with up to 11 farmers, who worked together using their own 
farming tools. Each group practiced measuring the land contour and constructing a layer of bench 
terracing with a water waste trench. In Talang Kuningan the participants also practiced constructing 
sedimentation pits measuring 4 x 1 x 1 metres. This activity took about three hours. At the short 
meetings after these training sessions, the participants discussed the application of these conservation 
techniques in their own coffee gardens.  
 
Figure 2. Farmers Practice Conservation Techniques during the Field Training 
2.2.4 Designing the Auction  
When using a procurement auction, one needs to carefully assess its design to ensure the 
reliability of value estimates and its implications for the rural community. We designed the auction via 
two preliminary stages of experiments: conventional laboratory experiments and framed field auction 
experiments6. From the literature, we determined the basic design of the auction: a sealed-bid Vickrey 
                                                 
 
6 This taxonomy of field experiments was proposed by Harrison and List (2004) and differentiated between field experiments 
and conventional lab experiments: 
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auction with multiple rounds. Each participant independently fills out and submits an offer-submission 
card that specifies the per-metre square or per-hectare price and number of metres square or hectares he 
proposes to join the contract. After the provisional winners are announced, either by their ID numbers 
or cut-off price, all participants (regardless of the status of their offer) are given the opportunity to hand 
in a revised offer or the experimenters can end the auction. In the event that the auction is ended, the 
provisional acceptances from the most recently completed round become the final acceptances. The 
payment format is a uniform format where the second highest bid is accepted.   
Table 3. Characterization of Proposed Auction Designs 
Auction component Options 
Auction type One-sided, sealed bid, 2nd price Vickrey with budget 
constrained 
Tie-rule Random 
Pricing rule Uniform 
Reserve price Without reserve price 
Bidding units Total WTA  
Bidder numbers Known 
Bidder strategy No collusion  
Activities contracted Determined in advance  
Number of rounds Announced in advance or concealed 
Announcement of provision winners Announced ID numbers or cut-off price 
Announcement of amount of limited 
budget 
Announced in advance or concealed 
 
Three scenarios were tested varying the amount of information received by the participants 
(Table 3): number of rounds, announcement of provision winners and announcement of the amount of 
limited budget. The results of the auction institutions from these experiments would be applied to the 
natural field auction experiments. Both the conventional lab and framed field auction experiments were 
hypothetical and non-binding. The natural field auction experiment, on the other hand, was binding for 
farmers; they joined contracted efforts to reduce erosion for one year.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
A conventional lab experiment is ―one that employs a standard subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and an imposed set 
of rules‖; 
A framed field experiment is an experiment that ―employs a nonstandard subject pool with field context in either the 
commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use‖; 
A natural field experiment is ―the same as a framed field experiment but the environment is one where the subjects naturally 
undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment‖  
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2.2.4.1 Conventional laboratory auction experiment  
Three conventional laboratory auction experiments involving undergraduate students were 
performed to familiarize the experimenters with the auction process and procedures, including the 
preparation of an auction spread sheet and script. The experiments were also done to train the 
enumerators in conducting the auction and in performing some surveys; to test some features in the 
auction environment; and to evaluate the auction performance in order to improve design at the field 
level. The experimenters decided that the scenario of this laboratory experiment would reveal the 
willingness of participants (e.g. undergraduate students) to accept a certain amount of money to do 
certain contracted activity. 
The hypothetical contracted activity was to clean their boarding room (Table 4). Cleaning 
included sweeping the floor, washing the floor, tidying up their bookshelves or work table, and dusting 
all furniture inside their bedroom. The cleaning was to be monitored by their boarding host (or 
appointed family/parents). The labor allocation was up to the students – whether they decided to do it 
themselves or sub-contract the job to others. Their payment would be held back if they broke the 
contract or if they performed poorly.  
The above scenario was applied to a real setting where farmers would be offered a bid to apply 
a contracted conservation technique on their private land. This conservation technique was assumed not 
only to reduce the erosion rate and river sedimentation on their farms, but also to maintain the fertility 
of their topsoil.  
Table 4. Conventional Laboratory Auction with Students 
Scenario To clean their boarding room once a week 
Frequency of monitoring Every weekend – continuously for six months 
Payment period 50 percent after signing the contract 
30 percent after three months of good implementation and  
20 percent at the end of the contract 
 
This laboratory experiment consisted of four main consecutive sessions: a socioeconomic and 
time-preference survey, a risk aversion game, the auction, and follow-up questions to evaluate the 
process. The auction was designed to minimize collusion amongst participants by reminding them not 
to consult each other during the process.  
2.2.4.2 Framed field auction experiment 
Two framed field auction experiments were performed in the field as follow-up activities to the 
laboratory experiment and as additional pre-tests for the actual auction implementation. The 
hypothetical field experiment involved two farmer groups because they had similar characteristics to 
the real auction participants – they were private landowners, and they cultivated coffee gardens as their 
major source of income. The field experiment participants also had institutions at the community level 
that resembled those of the final participants, such as existing farmer groups and other religion-based 
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community groups. In addition, these farmer groups were cooperative and they understood the nature 
of the research. It was expected that these criteria would be helpful in designing the final auction.   
The contracted activity was to construct soil and water conservation techniques. The activity 
would be monitored by local forestry service extension workers accompanied by ICRAF staff. The 
end-of-contract payment would be withheld if the farmers broke the contract and performed poorly. 
The auctioneer set a limited budget of Rp. 20,000,000, which was the average budget provided by the 
potential buyer – the hydropower company – from their annual corporate social responsibility fund.  
Table 5. Framed Field Auction with Farmers 
Scenario To apply ‗five eye‘ sediment pit and ridging combined with natural 
vegetative strip for one year 
Frequency of monitoring Every six months 
Payment period 50 percent after signing the contract and  
50 percent at the end of the contract 
 
2.2.4.3 Natural field experiment 
As the final experiments, two binding natural field auctions were conducted at two hamlets: 
Mulya Indah and Wanasari 1. The winners of these auctions would sign a one-year contract with 
ICRAF to conduct soil and land conservation activities on their land. The participants were farmers 
who privately owned and managed their coffee-gardens.  
The design of the contract components was based on FGDs with coffee farmers in the target 
villages. The FGDs were designed to gather information on farmers‘ preferences for soil conservation 
techniques and estimates of required labor investment. During the FGDs the experimenters did not 
mention anything about the auction or the specifics of the contract design. The potential for collusion in 
the auction setting was high, given the close community structure and social hierarchies within the 
communities. We decided to reduce collusion both in the preparation and the implementation of the 
auction.  
          
2.2.5 Auction Data Analysis  
The objective of this study is to design a set of auction rules for determining how the limited 
budget from the watershed rehabilitation fund will be allocated. The research focused on: 
2.2.5.1 Observable and non-observable factors influencing the final bids 
We observed the socioeconomic factors influencing the auction participants in submitting their 
final bids by applying a regression analysis with Reverse Helmert coding (or difference coding) as the 
additional coding systems for ordinal and categorical variables using the STATA 9.1 software. This 
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system compares each level of non-numeric variables to the mean of the subsequent level(s). Each 
variable is compared to the mean of previous level(s)7.  
2.2.5.2 Validity of auction design in a rural setting  
We analyzed the validity of applying this auction design in a rural setting in Indonesia by 
testing some factors. These factors were (1) technical factors, such as: farmers‘ understanding of 
auction rules, easiness of the rules, appropriateness of the bid offered during the auction, and fairness 
of the auction process; (2) social factors, such as: impact on relationships between contracted and non-
contracted farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information 
exchange between farmers; (3) environmental factors, such as awareness of soil and water conservation 
and rate of contract  accomplishment.    
For the technical factors, we hypothesized that the bidders‘ (farmers‘) learning process is 
influenced by the number of wins from previous rounds as well as farmers‘ perceptions of auction 
design factors. Data from the multiple bids submitted by each individual allows insights into farmers‘ 
understanding of the auction and learning across the multiple bidding rounds. Jack (2009) provides an 
analysis of the learning observed in the auction using the adjustments of bids between rounds as an 
indicator of learning and finds that individuals are responsive to previous round outcomes and rejects a 
simulated null hypothesis of random bidding. The data suggests that individuals do use the trial rounds 
to learn how to bid, but conclusions about whether they learn about the auction structure itself or about 
the value of the contract remain unclear. 
 
For analyzing the social factors (impact on relationships between contracted and non-contracted 
farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information exchange between 
farmers) and environmental factors (awareness of soil and water conservation and the rate of contract 
accomplishment), we applied Fisher‘s exact tests between two independent categorical variables. 
Fisher‘s exact test predicted the relationship between non-contracted and contracted farmers on each 
social and environmental variable. The application of Fisher‘s exact test assumes that each cell has an 
expected frequency of five or less.   
 
                                                 
 
7
 Introduction to SAS.  UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group.  




2.2.5.3 Risk and time preferences  
As suggested by Ferraro (2004), in addition to survey data collected on the observable 
characteristics of auction participants, the risk preferences and time preferences of participants were 
also considered.  
 
Risk preferences 
To date several approaches have been used to assess the importance and nature of risk aversion. 
Simple lottery choice tasks involving cash prizes were used to estimate the degree of risk aversion as 
well as specific functional forms. This experiment was based on six lottery choices from real situations, 
adapted from Holt and Laury (2002) and Ferraro (2004).   
 
Table 6. The Proposed Pay-off for Risk Experiment (Ferraro 2004) 
Decision Choice Cash pay-off (probability) 
1 A $ 5 (50 percent) $ 5 (50 percent ) - 
 B $ 8 (50 percent ) $ 4 (50 percent ) - 
 C $ 11 (50 percent ) $ 3 (50 percent ) - 
 D $ 14 (50 percent ) $ 2 (50 percent ) - 
 E $ 17 (50 percent ) $ 1 (50 percent ) - 
2 A $ 5 (100 percent ) - - 
 B $ 0 (5 percent ) $ 5 (75 percent ) $ 10 (20 percent ) 
3 A $ 0 (75 percent ) $ 5 (25 percent ) - 
 B $ 0 (80 percent ) $ 10 (20 percent ) - 
4 A $ 5 (100 percent ) - - 
 B $ 0 (20 percent ) $ 10 (80 percent ) - 
5 A $ 0 (5 percent) $ 5 (75 percent ) $ 10 (20 percent ) 
 B $ 0 (20 percent ) $ 10 (80 percent ) - 
6 A $ 5 (25 percent ) $ 10 (75 percent ) - 
 B $ 0 (5 percent ) $ 10 (95 percent ) - 
 
Time preferences  
Individual discount rate can represent time preferences. Harrison et al (2002) indicated that 
constant discount rates for specific household types was assumed, but not the same rates across all 
households. Respondents will be asked a simple basic question in order to elicit an individual discount 
rate: for example, applying to a time horizon of six months, do you prefer Rp. 50,000 in one month or 
Rp. 50,000+x in seven months? This delayed option involves greater transaction costs and the revealed 
discount rate would include these subjective transaction costs. By having both options entail future 
income, individuals hold any transaction costs or concerns about experimenter default constant.   
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Table 7. Time Preference Decision Sheet (adapted from Castillo et al, 2008) 
Decision Paid one month 
from now (Rupiah) 
Paid seven months 
from now (Rupiah) 
Discount rate 
1 50,000 52,000 7.88 percent 
2 50,000 54,000 15.56 percent 
3 50,000 56,000 22.95 percent  
4 50,000 58,000 30.13 percent  
5 50,000 60,000 37.07 percent  
6 50,000 62,000 43.74 percent  
7 50,000 64,000 50.19 percent  
8 50,000 67,000 60.25 percent  
9 50,000 69,000 66.19 percent  
10 50,000 71,000 71.89 percent  
11 50,000 74,000 80.47 percent  
12 50,000 77,000 89.96 percent  
13 50,000 79,000 94.93 percent  
14 50,000 82,000 103.23 percent  
15 50,000 85,000 111.21 percent  
16 50,000 88,000 118.94 percent  
17 50,000 91,000 126.33 percent  
18 50,000 94,000 133.49 percent  
19 50,000 97,000 140.35 percent  
20 50,000 100,000 146.93 percent  
 






3.1 Characteristics of Auction Participants  
Most of the farmers in the research sites are Sundanese, originating from West Java, and 
Javanese, originating from Central and East Java. They are either first- or second-generation Javanese 
migrants from the early 1950s–1970s, who mostly occupy certified private land. Each farmer owns an 
average of one hectare or less. Farmers who are owners and managers of their coffee farms derive their 
major income from coffee cultivation. Landowners with other occupations, such as smallholder-
trading, teaching, motorcycle-rental, or working for local government, usually rent their land to others 
and share the coffee harvests.  
Based on the hydrological survey of the sub-watershed, we selected two sites, Way Ringkih 
(Site 1) and Way Lirikan (Site 2), with a high sedimentation rate. In addition to this biophysical 
consideration, we set qualifications for selecting eligible participants for the auction project. The 
farmers had to own their land and be actively managing the land themselves. These stipulations were 
made in order to avoid conflicts on signature of contract and regarding payment, and to ensure that the 
farmers do not neglect their land after signing the contract. Farmers on private land need incentives to 
manage their land sustainably. Since this study took place in a sub-watershed, the minimum number of 
eligible farmers needed to increase the salience of the study was 20 (Ferraro 2004).  
There were 44 and 45 households eligible in the sub-watersheds respectively. The Way Ringkih 
sub-watershed consists of two talang (hamlets in the local language): Talang Harapan and Talang 
Kuningan (Site 1). The Way Lirikan sub-watershed consists of one talang: Talang Anyar (Site 2). 
ICRAF scientists facilitated participatory water-monitoring activities in Way Ringkih and Way Lirikan. 
These water-monitoring activities gave additional benefits that contributed to the measurement of the 
study‘s environmental impact.  
The farmers‘ livelihoods depend on coffee farming, either as owners of coffee gardens or as 
laborers to other farmers. Their daily wage was about USD 1.67 (Rp. 15,000). In Talang Anyar, many 
farmers had alternative jobs and did not rely on their coffee garden as their main livelihood. We 
observed that the farmers in Talang Kuningan and Talang Harapan were more responsive and 
enthusiastic compared to those in Talang Anyar. The community in Talang Anyar rarely got involved 
in collective action because of the scattered locations of their houses. Summary statistics from the 









Table 8. Village Characteristics for Auction Participants 
Variable Talang Harapan and 
Talang Kuningan 
(Site 1) 
Talang Anyar (Site 2) 
Assets (Rupiah) 3,663.4 13,649.0 
Age 41.1 43.4 
Education (years) 5.28 6.41 
Number of HH family members 3.7 4.0 
Number of years owning land  14.2 15.4 
Plot size (ha) 0.7 1.1 
   
Social capital and conservation awareness8   
Farmers with experience in applying 
conservation techniques in the past  
92 percent 91 percent 
Availability of any current conservation 
techniques  
69 percent 79 percent 
Assistance from government 25 percent 41 percent 
Trust   
Mostly trust internal members of the 
community  
94 percent 74 percent 
Always trust the outsiders 98 percent 88 percent 
   
Land physical characteristics    
Farmers with slopes more than 25 percent 77 percent 100 percent 
Vegetation structure of coffee garden    
Monoculture coffee 2 percent 9 percent 
Shade coffee 25 percent 6 percent 
Multistrata coffee 73 percent 85 percent 
   
Distance to road (in minutes walking) 34.7 13.6 
   
 
As shown in Table 8, the first site is poorer, with farmers working on smaller plots of land that 
are further from a paved road. In the second site participants had lower levels of trust in community 
members and in outsiders, and also got more assistance from the government. Most of the farmers had 
shade and multistata coffee gardens and had experience of applying conservation techniques in the 
past, which some farmers still practiced. On average, both sites have similar levels of risk preference. 
Most of the participants are risk-neutral to risk-loving (Figure 3). From the time preference experience 
we found that about 85 percent of the participants have severe (51 percent to 100 percent) and extreme 
(more than 100 percent) discount rates (Figure 4). This finding is consistent with the conditions in rural 
areas in developing countries, where the level of subsistence is very high and people heavily depend on 
their immediate cash to fulfill their daily food needs.    
                                                 
 





Figure 3. Level of Risk Preference at the Two Sites 
 
 
Note: Almost neutral (less than 10 percent discount rate); moderate (18 percent-25 percent discount rate); 
intermediate (26 percent to 50 percent discount rate); severe (51 percent to 100 percent discount rate); extreme 
(more than 100 percent discount rate) 
Figure 4. Level of Time Preference at the Two Sites 
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving
Site 1 13% 60% 27%























Moderate Intermediate Severe Extreme
Site 1 6% 0% 13% 29% 52%

























3.2 Perceived Watershed Problems and Farmers’ Local Management Options 
The PALA confirmed that there were major problems in the watershed, such as erosion, 
flooding, river ridge landslides, critical land, and clean water availability9. Most of the farmers did not 
frequency apply fertilizer and experienced high acidity and compacted soil, all of which cause 
difficulties in soil cultivation. These problems perceivably caused infertile and dying coffee trees and 
were responsible for low productivity. Another cause of the high erosion rate was the small numbers of 
shade trees – land with a high potential for erosion and landslides is located along the riparian and hilly 
ridge.  
Farmers lacked technical knowledge of land management and soil conservation. Agricultural 
extension from the local government was inadequate in the area. Therefore, farmer groups were 
inactive and rarely conducted collective watershed maintenance action.   
In the past, many farmers practiced land conservation techniques copied from their neighbors. 
However, most of these practices were discontinued because of a lack of incentives and motivation. 
The main reason was the lack of financial capital to invest in land conservation. Rather than spend 
money on land conservation, which would have been a beneficial long-term investment, some farmers 
chose to invest in alternative livelihoods. Despite these inadequacies, however, they showed genuine 
enthusiasm and a willingness to have better access to information. They realized that if they do not 
change their conditions the environment could be further degraded, resulting in lower coffee 
productivity. Some farmers in this area use erosion pits because it is a simple and cheap technique that 
is applicable even to land on a steep slope. The ideal number of erosion pits per hectare is 600 and the 
ideal model is the ‗five eye‘ model – featuring one erosion pit in the middle of four coffee trees within 
20 working days. The width and depth of each erosion pit depends on the land conditions and the 
interval of coffee trees. In Talang Kuningan and Talang Harapan, some farmers have applied terracing. 
The number of terraces per hectare vary depending on the slope and size of the land – the steeper the 
slope, the more frequent the interval of terraces.  
3.3 Contract Design of the Procurement Auction 
The contracts offered are specified in Table 9. These contracts were in line with the farmers‘ 
preferred conservation activities.10 The sediment pit is the most favored technique because it is cheap 
and easy to construct. The farmers stated that if a conservation program was to be conducted, they 
would prefer it to start in August–September, after the harvesting period had ended. In Talang 
Kuningan, there was a suggestion that monitoring be intensively conducted in the first three months, 
for example once a month, and after that monitoring could be performed once every three months.   
The contract was for one year. The activities were monitored and evaluated by local forestry 
service extension workers accompanied by ICRAF staff every three months. The contract was to be 
                                                 
 
9 Detailed information on PALA results can be found in Widodo (2006).  
10 Copies of the contract are available from the lead author upon request. 
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paid in two installments: 50 percent after signing the contract and 50 percent at the end of the contract 
(one year), as suggested by the FGDs. The second installment of the payment was withheld if the 
farmers broke the contract and performed poorly.  
 
Table 9. Contract Offered for the Procurement Auction  
Soil conservation activities  
 
Sediment pits: 300 per hectare, evenly distributed, standard 
dimensions: 100 x 150 x 40 cm 
Ridging: 50 percent of plot  
Vegetation strips: surrounding pits and ridging 
Maintaining all the land conservation structure for a year 
Payment schedule 50 percent at inception; 50 percent at one year contingent on 
performance 
Duration and monitoring One year with monitoring every three months; termination if 50 
percent contracted activities are not completed by midterm 
monitoring date 
Cancellation or non-compliance results: 
Ineligibility for second payment installation: 
Friction and conflict between community members, indications of corruption: 
Contract to be cancelled if any natural disasters or events occur 
 
3.4 Designing the Auction  
3.4.1 Laboratory Auction Experiment  
The outcomes of the student experimental auction guided the revision of the auction‘s 
implementation in the field testing and in the final auction. Firstly, feedback from the students‘ auction 
indicated what instructions, activities, or questions were unclear or misleading. This feedback was 
analyzed to provide guidelines in amending both the enumeration technique and the survey content that 
would be used for the field test among farmers. For instance, since the survey was the most confusing 
activity for the students, verbal enumeration may be conducted for farmers so as to allow them to 
interrupt and ask questions. To revise misleading questions (content), enumerators would have to note 
questions that farmers want clarified.   
At the first auction, the ID number of each winner was announced after each round was 
completed. No other information was given, including the number of rounds. For the first scenario, the 
facilitators observed the participants and stopped the auction when they noticed the participants losing 
interest and the bid value became relatively stable. In this case, the second and third scenarios follow 
the tendency of the first auction and the experimenters decided to stop the auctions after eight rounds 






Table 10. Variation in Scenarios for Laboratory Experiment Auction 








1 No No No 14 
2 Yes  No Yes, before round 4 16 
3 Yes Yes No 24 
 
Comparison of auction outcomes indicates that announcing prices between bidding rounds may 
change bidding behavior in ways that are undesirable. This behavior suggests that bids may have been 
anchored on cut-off prices rather than on estimated opportunity cost.  Given that one of the auction‘s 
objectives was to obtain accurate assessments of opportunity cost, removing this tendency to anchor 
can lead to more accurate results. Further evidence that announced prices may have been used as an 
anchor was the measure of the average price-WTA gap for each scenario. Averaging the amount that 
the uniform price exceeded winning bids indicated that students in the third scenario adjusted their bids 
upward, toward the announced price, resulting in a smaller gap in the third scenario. The cut-off price 
in the third scenario was also the highest of the three, indicating the least cost-effective results and 
fewest winners, which were also likely because of the anchoring of bids on the announced price, which 
draws up average bids and makes conservation – or cleanliness – more expensive. 
The other two treatments – announcing the number of rounds and announcing the budget limit – 
did not appear to have a significant effect on bidding behavior as observed in the similar outcomes 
between scenarios 1 and 2. Variability in the final round was somewhat higher in the second scenario, 
when the number of rounds was announced; however, the difference was insignificant and the total 
variability was also somewhat higher. Also, in the second scenario, announcement of the total budget 
after the third round did not produce an observable change in bidding strategies.   
Given the lack of significant effects from either of these treatments, selecting the most 
straightforward approach in order to minimize confusion among farmers, would produce the most 
reliable outcomes. Testing the announcement of the number of bidding rounds would still be feasible in 
the field auction trial. However, announcement of the total budget appeared insignificant. Hence, it 
may be best not to disclose the total budget to allow for greater flexibility in contract awards. 
Based on the results of the experimental student auction, the following adjustments would be 
made and evaluated during the experimental farmer auction: 
1) The auction would be implemented twice, both times using an n-sided, sealed bid, uniform 
second price Vickrey design with budget constraints and random tie breaking rule. 
Identification numbers of provisional winners would be announced between rounds. The 
number of participants and number of rounds would be kept constant between the two 
auctions, though in only one of the two would the number of rounds be disclosed in advance. 
Because of the sealed-bid, the experimenter must carefully explain the procedure in 
submitting bids, especially on how to write down the bid value.   
2) Survey questions would be adapted from student-targeted information to farmer-specific 
questions, and additional questions would elicit qualitative measures of risk and time 
preferences. Specific attention would be paid to questions that may help identify variations 
in WTA emerging from farmer characteristics other than heterogeneity in direct 




3.4.2 Framed Field Auction Experiment 
Based on outcomes from the laboratory experiment and on the theoretical considerations 
discussed, the only aspect of the auction design that required further testing was the announcement of 
the number of rounds in the field trial. In the first trial, the number of rounds was not announced to the 
farmers prior to the auction, but it was announced in the second trial. Individual bidding behavior and 
total expenditures were compared to assess which approach induced preferred outcomes. 
 
Table 11. Characterization of Framed Field Auctions 
Auction component Options 
Auction type One-sided, sealed bid, second price Vickrey with budget 
constraints 
Tie-rule Random 
Pricing rule Uniform  
Reserve price Without reserve price 
Bidding units 
 
Total WTA  
Bidder numbers Known 
Bidder strategy No collusion  
Activities contracted Determined in advance  
Announcement of provision winners Announce ID numbers  
Announcement of amount of limited 
budget 
Concealed 
Number of rounds Concealed or announced before the auction 
 
Table 12. Variation in Scenarios for Framed Field Auction 
Session Number of rounds announced Number of participants 
1 No 46 
2 Yes 43 
 
An additional unresolved consideration of auction design involves the choice between a 
uniform price rule and a discriminatory price rule. The choice is likely to result in tradeoffs between 
equity and cost-effectiveness, with uniform pricing more likely to reveal farmers‘ true opportunity cost 
(Table 2). Consultations with farmers during the FGDs showed equal preference for uniform and 
discriminative pricing. For discriminative pricing, they considered high slope variability on their land‘s 
yield and different levels of difficulty in applying the conservation techniques. The household survey 
also tried to capture these payment formats. However, most farmers thought that the difference should 
have been based on the size of the land and on the cost of applying the conservation techniques but not 
the difference of payment per hectare. Since considerations of equity would not be revealed through 
bidding behavior, the choice of pricing rule was not tested in the field experiment. The ultimate choice 
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to use uniform pricing came from a combination of theoretical considerations and farmer preferences 
revealed during the focus group discussions.  
Since one of the objectives of this study was to reveal the farmers‘ willingness to accept joining 
a conservation program, uniform pricing strategy gave bidders incentives to bid their true opportunity 
costs (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
Lessons from the theory and the experiments are that the returns in bidding come from cost and 
information advantages, that naïve bidding strategies can squander these advantages, and that the 
bidders without some advantage have little hope of earning much profit, but could with a little bit of 
carelessness suffer large losses (winner‘s curse). 
In the field auction two scenarios were developed to determine the optimal auction design that 
would represent the farmers‘ willingness to accept joining a conservation program. The auction‘s 
results in the allocation of contracts would expectedly leave people better (or at least as well off). The 
enumerators and facilitators would then have chances to test the auction‘s procedures and script‘s 
explanations.  
1. Auction procedures and script 
Most of the farmers found that after joining several rounds they became familiar with the 
auction process. However, some farmers had difficulties with writing. For example, they could not 
differentiate how many zeros there were in thousands and millions. The enumerators had to help them 
to write their bids. For the real auction, we separated these farmers and requested that they to sit in the 
front row. We then divided the enumerators between these farmers so that they had someone to take 
care of them and to check their answers. During the data entries, the researchers also re-checked these 
farmers‘ answers and asked the enumerators to clarify anything that was not legibly written.   
It was anticipated that some participants would be motivated to bid only for the money. Hence, 
the facilitator had to repeat the contract every two rounds in order to remind the participants to bid 
properly. In the field auction, two farmers submitted irrationally high bids. In a follow-up interview we 
discovered that they thought we wanted to bid for their land, hence they offered high land prices. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to repeat the substance of the contract and to re-check the bid values 
before data entry.  
2. Contract  
In the real auction, the contract would provide more information to farmers. Some contract 
elements, such as the number of sediment pits and their size, percentage of required ridging, and 
penalty and monitoring processes would be clarified and detailed. 
3. Auction design 
The field auction result indicated that there was no significant difference between concealing 
and announcing the number of rounds. Consultations with experts indicated that by concealing the 
number of rounds, one piece of information in the auction itself varied among participants. Since the 
number of rounds was not announced, each participant had his/her own subjective probability 
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distribution about how likely it was that each round would be the last. This was a problem because in 
each round, some people acted like it was the last round, while others thought that they still had many 
more rounds to play. Therefore, for the real auction, the facilitator should pre-announce the number of 
rounds so that all the farmers approach each round with the same expectations.   
The auction would be implemented at two pilot sites, both times using an n-sided, sealed bid, 
uniform second price Vickrey design, with budget constraints and the random tie breaking rule. 
Identification numbers of provisional winners would be announced between rounds and the number of 
participants and number of rounds would be kept constant between the two auctions. Further, the 
number of rounds would be pre-announced.  
3.4.3 Natural Field Auction Experiment 
Based on outcomes from the laboratory and field experiments and from the theoretical 
considerations discussed in this report, the design of this auction was a sealed bid auction with budget 
constraints, the random tie-rule, the uniform pricing rule, minimized collusion, announced ID numbers 
of provisional winners and a pre-announced number of rounds11 (Table 13). The auctioneer set a 
limited budget of USD 2,000 (Rp. 20,000,000) per auction or a total USD 4,000 – which is the average 
budget provided by the potential buyer, the hydropower company, for its annual corporate social 
responsibility fund.  
Table 13. Characterization of Actual Auction 
Auction component Options 
Auction type One-sided, sealed bid, second price Vickrey with budget 
constraints 
Tie-rule Random 
Pricing rule Uniform  
Reserve price Without reserve price 
Bidding units 
 
Total WTA  
Bidder numbers Known 
Bidder strategy No collusion  
Activities contracted Determined in advance  
Announcement of provisional winners Announce ID numbers  
Announcement of amount of limited 
budget 
Concealed 
Number of rounds Announced before the auction 
 
The auction followed a fairly standard format, with a single buyer and multiple sellers 
submitting sealed bids representing their willingness to accept the soil conservation contract for their 





plot. Bids were assessed according to a per-hectare price and the cut-off price was determined by a pre-
set budget constraint. The budget constraint remained concealed to prevent normative or distributional 
considerations from affecting bid prices. Each farmer entered only one plot of land and eligibility rules 
required that participants have clear land tenure and engaged in coffee farming as their primary 
occupation. 
The pilot auction was modeled as a private value auction, and most of the literature on 
conservation auctions follows this approach. However, individual uncertainty over the labor costs of 
the contract may introduce some common value element to bidder behavior. The decision to use 
multiple rounds, with the final round setting the price allowed farmers to use early rounds as a learning 
opportunity, both to reduce confusion over the mechanism and to learn about the willingness to accept 
of other participants.   
The number of rounds was announced in advance to eliminate subjective beliefs about the 
number of rounds and to induce participants to base their bids only on their willingness to accept in the 
final round. Bidder strategies in earlier rounds might include bid prices aimed at information elicitation. 
Bids were submitted simultaneously, and the anonymous identification numbers of the winners were 
announced between rounds. Ties at the cut-off price were broken randomly. 
A uniform second price rule was used to set the final contract price, though a discriminatory 
second price rule would have further eliminated rents to the farmers. The decision to provide a single 
price was based on several contextual considerations. Firstly, communication among participants 
following the auction was judged to be very likely and a discriminatory price auction was seen as a 
potential source of conflict between contracted farmers. Secondly, because the farmers were relatively 
poor and the project wanted to minimize the risk that any farmer may be made worse off under the 
contract, an approach that allowed for greater uncertainty around the bid prices was preferred. An 
estimate of the potential conservation forgone, using elicited bid prices suggested that just over one 
additional hectare of soil conservation activity could have been purchased on the margin had a 
discriminatory second price rule been used instead of a uniform second price rule.  
3.5 Natural Field Auction Data Analysis 
In total, 82 farmers – 48 farmers from Mulya Indah and 34 farmers from Wanasari – 
participated in the two auctions. Of these, farmers were awarded contracts that provided for soil 
conservation activities in 25 hectares (Table 14). The contract price per hectare was USD 17212; the 
mean bid was USD 263.   
 
                                                 
 
12 USD 1 = 9,300 Rupiah  
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Table 14.  Auction Summary Statistics13 
 Site 1 Site 2 Pooled Pooled 
(without outlier) 
Number of participants 48 34 82  
Number of winners 19 15 34 
Number of hectares 
contracted 
10.75 14.25 25 
Contract price per hectare 
(USD) 178 167 172 
Median bid (USD) 222 167 182 
Mean bid (USD) 311 269 294 263 
Minimum bid (USD) 100 67 67 67 
Maximum bid (USD) 2,778 778 2,778 1,111 
Std. deviation bid (USD) 178 167 172 0 
 
The bids followed an exponential distribution with a long tail at the low cost end (Figure 5). As 
a result, the distribution of bids below the cut-off price was fairly tight, which is reflected in the low 
estimate of additional cost savings through a discriminatory price approach. The distribution also had 
implications for the design of a fixed payment system and for the purchase potential of different 
budgets. 
 
                                                 
 




Figure 5. Supply Curve Resulting from the Procurement Auction 
 
To validate the results of the auction, the implementing organization collected information to 
estimate labor costs using two approaches: an individual household survey and FGDs. The researchers 
asked farmers if they had implemented any of these activities in the past, and if so, how many days 
were required. The estimates based on retrospective calculations were slightly lower, around USD 300 
(Rp 2,800,000 – Rp 3,000,000), including forgone wages from the farmers‘ own labor investment. The 
price set by the auction mechanism was USD 172 (Rp. 1.55 million) per hectare, and was determined 
by a combination of the budget and the bid distribution.14 The estimated labor costs were 81 percent 
higher than the auction price, and 30 percent higher than the median bid. With the estimated labor 
costs, the contractor could have only purchased 6.7 to 7.1 hectares, as opposed to the 25 hectares 
purchased through the auction. 
An auction mechanism faces two important potential limitations. Firstly, landholders must have 
private information about costs. If costs are derived entirely from a common value embedded in 
contract implementation, then the auction will not be able to truthfully reveal any private information 
(or the auction mechanism is not incentive compatible). Secondly, participants must understand the 
                                                 
 
14 Total hectares of conservation activity purchased was determined by the budget restriction and by the plot size of the 





mechanism well enough to be influenced by the competitive nature of the bidding process. By holding 
seven trial rounds prior to the final allocation round, the Sumberjaya auction design allowed for 
learning about common values and the auction mechanism. Follow-up survey data on participant 
impressions and information from contract monitoring suggested whether or not both of these 
assumptions were satisfied. 
3.5.1 Factors Influencing Amount of Final Bids 
The objective in analysing the bid outcomes was to understand the socioeconomic factors that 
influence auction participants when submitting their final bids. Factors influencing the amount of final 
bids were categorized as respondents‘ characteristics (assets, age, education, number of household 
members, and number of years owning farming land), the physical characteristics of the land (slope, 
position, soil texture and color, vegetation type, and distance to road), social capital and conservation 
awareness (past conservation investment, current conservation investment, access to assistance from 
the government, and internal and external trust), and risk and time preferences (Table 15).  
The observable variables, such as the characteristics of respondents, their land, social capital, 
conservation awareness level, and risk and time preferences, had low explanatory power for the 
submission of final bids. The adjusted R2 value from the regression analysis was 0.1423 and the 
regression was only slightly significant. However, the model shows that the mean of the final bid 
submitted by farmers owning coffee gardens with multistrata systems was relatively lower and 
significant at 5 percent, compared to the mean of the final bid submitted by farmers owning 
monoculture coffee gardens with shade coffee. Farmers with mixed crop coffee submitted lower bids 
compared to farmers with monoculture and shade coffee. Farmers owning land on steeper slopes 
submitted lower bids compared to farmers with land on flat and medium slopes. This result was at odds 
with our hypothesis that steeper land is usually more costly than flat land. Farmers with sandy clay soil 
submitted higher bids compared to farmers with clay soil (this was assessed by interpreting soil texture 
data). Sandy clay soil is easier to cultivate compared to clay soil. The distance to the road variable was 
significant at 10 percent and farmers with land further from a tarmac road submitted higher bids, 
revealing that farming practices far from roads bear an increased cost.  
There was a significant difference of 15 percent between the mean final bid submitted by 
farmers with intermediate time preferences compared to the mean final bid of farmers with moderate or 
almost neutral time preferences. People with a higher discount rate submitted lower bids. People with a 
higher discount rate were judged more likely to be impatient, implying a greater propensity to consume 
now, rather than later, and a tendency to be less motivated by future consequences (Reyes-Garcia et al 
2007; Skog 2001).  
Table 15. Factors Influencing the Submission of Final Bids in Logarithmic Scale 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error  P > | t | 
Respondents’ characteristics    
Asset1 0.0911 0.1172 0.44 
Age 0.0086 0.0081 0.29 
Education  0.0288 0.0295 0.33 
Number of HH family members 0.0791 0.0723 0.28 
Number of years owning land  -0.0020 0.0099 0.84 
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Variables Coefficient Standard Error  P > | t | 
    
Social capital and conservation 
awareness 
   
Experience in applying conservation 
techniques in the past  -0.2176 0.3019 0.47 
Availability of any current 
conservation techniques  -0.0402 0.2057 0.85 
Assistance from government 0.2166 0.1949 0.27 
Trust    
Trust in community -0.0737 0.2429 0.76 
Trust in outsiders -0.0052 0.3461 0.99 
    
Physical characteristics of the land    
Slope    
Flat - - - 
Medium (15-25%) -0.0734 0.2748 0.79 
Steep (25-40%)  -0.4419 0.2212 0.05** 
Position    
Top - - - 
Middle 0.0466 0.2539 0.86 
Bottom -0.2565 0.1759 0.15 
Soil texture    
Clay - - - 
Sandy clay 0.4172 0.2529 0.11* 
Sand -0.2359 0.2309 0.31 
Soil color    
Black - - - 
Red  -0.2151 0.2111 0.31 
Yellow -0.1112 0.2096 0.60 
Vegetation structure of coffee garden    
Monoculture coffee - - - 
Shade coffee 0.3416 0.4253 0.43 
Multistrata coffee -0.3989 0.2437 0.11* 
    
Distance to road  0.0083 0.0046 0.08** 
    
Risk and time preferences    
Risk preference    
Risk averse - - - 
Risk neutral 0.2206 0.2631 0.41 
Risk loving -0.1720 0.1912 0.37 
Time preference    
Almost neutral - - - 
Moderate -0.1010 0.8540 0.91 
Intermediate -0.7195 0.4693 0.13* 
Severe -0.3407 0.3337 0.31 
Extreme -0.2776 0.2292 0.23 
N = 82    
Prob > F = 0.1029    
R-square = 0.4282    





1 in logarithmic scale 
*** Significantly different values at the 5 percent level 
** Significantly different values at the 10 percent level   
* Significantly different values at the 15 percent level 
 
3.6 Auction Applicability and Aftermath 
3.6.1 Design Factors: Farmers’ Understanding of Auction Design and the Auction Aftermath  
A post-auction interview revealed that most farmers understood the rules when implementing 
the conservation auction (Table 17). Three farmers out of 48 (4 percent) did not understand the rules 
and all of them lost. About 32 percent of the farmers, both winning and losing, understood the rules 
very well. Most farmers were satisfied with the completeness of information provided by the 
facilitators when implementing the auction. The participants found it relatively easy to understand the 
rules for implementing the auction and for deciding the winners. The wining farmers interpreted the 
rules more easily compared to the losing ones. Most farmers thought that the auction process and the 
determination of the winner had been conducted fairly (88 percent). The farmers who felt that the 
auction was unfair mostly lost. Most farmers (78 percent) were fully aware that competition was taking 
place the auction participants in order to win the contract and that the budget of auctioneer was limited.  








Understanding of the auction rules     
Not understand at all 3 (0.06) 0 (0.00) 3 
Moderately understand 16 (0.33) 8 (0.24) 24 
Quite understand 11 (0.23) 12 (0.35) 23 
Understand 3 (0.06) 3 (0.09) 6 
Understand very well 15 (0.31) 11 (0.32) 26 
Complexity of the auction rules    
Very difficult 2 (0.04) 1 (0.03) 3 
Quite difficult 17 (0.35) 14 (0.41) 31 
Quite easy 7 (0.15) 10 (0.29) 17 
Easy  18 (0.38) 7 (0.21) 25 
Very easy 4 (0.08) 2 (0.06) 6 
    
Fairness of the auction implementation     
Not fair 7 (0.15) 3 (0.09) 10 
Fair 41 (0.85) 31 (0.91) 72 




Not aware 10 (0.21) 9 (0.26) 19 
Aware 38 (0.79) 25 (0.74) 64 
Contract value received    
Too low 19 (0.40) 5 (0.15) 24 
Not too low 17 (0.35) 17 (0.50) 34 
Moderate 12 (0.25) 12 (0.35) 24 
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High  - - - 
Too high - - - 
Willingness to change the offer     
Yes 12 (0.25) 12 (0.35) 24 
No 36 (0.75) 22 (0.65) 58 
Note: proportion in parenthesis  
 
As predicted, about 40 percent of the losing farmers considered the contract value per hectare to 
be too low. About 70 percent of all participants found that the value was either not too low or 
moderate. The median appropriate total amount of contract value per hectare according to interviewed 
farmers was USD 246 (Rp. 2,000,000) or about 12.5 percent higher than the cut-off price. Most of them 
would be likely to change their previous bid if they had another chance to offer a new bid. From the 
follow-up interview, however, we found that 32 percent of farmers wanted to change their previous 
bids, 28 percent of farmers would decrease their offer and the remaining 40 percent of farmers would 
increase their offers. A statistical test revealed that the average final bid as the result of the auction 
differed to the mean of the appropriate amount of contract value in the participants‘ opinion after the 
auction (Table 18). The overall value proposed after the auction was higher. 
Table 17. Contract Value per Hectare Offered by Farmers after Auction 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum P-value 
Appropriate total 
amount of contract 
value per hectare  
246 120 161 753 0.0000***           
N: 80 individuals 
*p<.15, **p<.10, ***p<.05 
 
We used the framework of bid adjustments during the trial as a proxy way of learning (Jack 
2009) to further investigate farmer responses about understanding the auction process (Table 18). The 
independent variable was bid adjustment for each respondent at each round and the dependent 
variables were parameters representing farmers‘ perceptions of design factors such as understanding of 
auction rules, easiness of the rules, fairness of the auction process and awareness of competition 
between participants. We found that farmers who stated that they ―understand‖ the auction rules had 
reliable different mean of bid adjustments compared to the average mean of bid adjustment of farmers 
who stated ―not understand at all‖, ―moderately understand‖, and ―quite understand‖. Farmers who 
thought that the auction rules were quite easy adjusted their bids upward compared to those who stated 
that the auction rules were very difficult or difficult (level 1 and level 2). We analyzed the mean bid 
adjustments of famers who were aware of competition and found a significant difference compared to 





Table 18. Farmers’ Understanding of Auction Design 
Variables  Coefficient  Standard 
error  
P-value  
Understanding of the auction rules     
Not understand at all - -- - 
Moderately understand -0.1077 0.06 0.09** 
Quite understand -0.0262 0.05 0.57 
Understand -0.1035 0.05 0.03*** 
Very understand -0.0121 0.05 0.80 
Easiness of the rules    
Very difficult - - - 
Difficult -0.0019 0.07 0.98 
Quite easy -0.0856 0.04 0.04*** 
Easy  0.0112 0.05 0.82 
Very easy 0.0191 0.05 0.70 
Fairness of the auction 
implementation     
Not fair - - - 
Fair 0.0054 0.04 0.90 
Awareness of competition between 
participants    
Not aware - - - 
Aware -0.0604 0.04 0.14* 
    
Number of observation = 492    
Number of groups = 82    
Wald chi-square(12) = 49.94    
Prob > chi-square = 0.00    
Note: 
*p<.15, **p<.10, ***p<.05 
 
3.6.2 Social Factors: Impact on Communities  
As far as social conditions and interaction among community members was concerned, the 
auction participants experienced slightly significant changes (Table 19). There was a statistically 
significant 5-percent difference between the non-contracted and contracted farmers when evaluating 
the relationship between winners and losers. Non-contracted and contracted farmers had an almost 
similar perspective on interpersonal relationships among the community in the talang after the auction. 
The impact on information exchange between farmers was statistically significant at 10 percent. The 
contracted farmers gave better evaluation of the social impacts of the auction and of conservation 





Table 19. Perspective of Non-contracted and Contracted Farmers on Social Impacts 





Fisher‘s exact test  
P-value 
Impact on relationships between 
winners and losers 
  0.143* 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 5 (0.10) 6 (0.18) 
Quite good 17 (0.35) 9 (0.26) 
Good  21 (0.44) 19 (0.56 
Very good 5 (0.10) 0 (0.00) 
Impact on general interpersonal 
relationships among the community  
  0.175 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 3 (0.06) 2 (0.06) 
Quite good 18 (0.38) 13 (0.38) 
Good  21 (0.44) 19 (0.56) 
Very good 6 (0.13) 0 (0.00) 
Impact on information exchange 
between farmers 
  0.055** 
Very bad 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 7  (0.15) 0 (0.00) 
Quite good 19 (0.40) 17 (0.50) 
Good  13 (0.27) 14 (0.41) 
Very good 8 (0.17) 3 (0.09) 
 Note: proportion in parenthesis  
 
3.6.3 Environmental Factors: Awareness of Conservation and Rate of Accomplishment  
There were no significant differences between contracted and non-contracted farmers of their 
awareness and willingness to implement soil and water conservation on their land (Table 20). Some 
farmers expressed the view (via interviews) that enthusiasm amongst farmers for conserving the 











Table 20. Perspective on Environmental Impacts from Non-contracted and Contracted Farmers 






Fisher‘s exact test  
P-value 
Awareness of soil and water conservation    0.188 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)  
Bad 2 (0.04) 1 (0.03)  
Quite good 30 (0.63) 16 (0.47)  
Good  7 (0.15) 12 (0.35)  
Very good 9 (0.19) 5 (0.15)  
Willingness to implement soil and water 
conservation  
   0.340 (0.509) 
No 2 (0.04) 0 (0.00)  
Yes 46 (0.96) 34 (1.00)  
Note: results from two-sided Fisher‘s exact test are in parenthesis. The others are calculated from one-sided Fisher‘s exact 
test  
For the frequency column, proportion is in parenthesis  
 
3.7 Contract Monitoring 
The research team conducted alternate qualitative and quantitative monitoring activities in the 
field every three months. The qualitative monitoring gathered information on contract implementation 
by using open-ended questions. The enumerators checked the general quality of the conservation 
structure and asked farmers whether or not they had any difficulty implementing their contacts. During 
the quantitative monitoring the enumerators counted the numbers of sediment pits, grass strips, and 
ridging. They measured the size of sediment pits and observed the quality of the grass strips and 
ridging. They also surveyed social interactions between farmers and other conservation structures that 
were not required by the contract, such as water drainage and terracing. This monitoring involved two 
external evaluators from the District Forestry Service who independently gave scores on the farmers‘ 
accomplishments. The head of the village accompanied the team as a witness to fair evaluation. 
Farmers who could not accomplish at least 50 percent of the contracted activities had to give up and 
could not continue their contracts. At the final monitoring, the implementing agency paid the remaining 
fund to farmers who accomplished at least 80 percent of the contracted activities. 
Most farmers built good quality ridging. The quality of ridging improved after the observation 
conducted in Phase 1 of the monitoring (three months after signature of contract). Out of 34 contracted 
farmers, three farmers had to amend their ridging and one farmer had not instituted any ridging at all. 
Almost all of the farmers constructed sediment pits of the required size and standard. Two farmers 
failed to fulfill the 50 percent target of the total number of sediment pits required. However, in general, 
most of the farmers achieved above and beyond the contract for the construction of both ridging and 
sediment pits. The average total achievement in Wanasari 1 was 86 percent and 102 percent in Mulya 
Indah. The planting of grass strips was problematic. Only half of the farmers planted the grass due to 
the dry season and the difficulty of finding seeds. Most farmers prioritized the ridging and sediment 
pits instead and put off grass planting in the meantime. The coffee harvesting season also delayed the 
grass-planting process.  
36 
 
A contract with a farmer from Wanasari I (Site 2) had to be terminated because of poor 
performance (only 4 percent accomplishment). The exit interview revealed that the main reason for the 
farmer‘s poor performance was the higher opportunity cost of getting jobs beyond than the contract‘s 
value. Because of his lower economic status compared to others and his small landholding of only 0.5 
hectare, the farmer had to spend most of his time working as a farm laborer, leaving him little time to 
manage his own coffee garden. However, the farmer affirmed that the auction was fair and that the 
conservation program was important in motivating farmers to conserve their lands. 
 
3.7.1. Second Qualitative Monitoring and Final Quantitative Monitoring (Phases 3 and 4) 
During the final quantitative monitoring, most of the farmers showed good progress in 
implementing their contracts. Table 21 compiles the results of how they implemented the conservation 
efforts stipulated in their contracts. They excelled in constructing ridging (128 percent 
accomplishment) and sediment pits (114 percent accomplishment, but they lagged behind in making 
the vegetative strips (88 percent accomplishment). They also practiced other conservation techniques 
like the building of terracing and drainage that could optimally support the contracted conservation 
efforts. All the farmers constructed terracing, which could be done simultaneously with ridging. Half of 
them built drainage systems.  
Table 21. Conservation Results at the End of the One-year Contract 
Site Ridging Sediment pit Vegetative strip 
 I % II % I  II % I  II % 




313 180 1583 
95 
1789 111 212 
122 
223 128 
Talang Harapan 175 97 188 104 1178 93 1339 106 23 13 75 42 
Sub-total Site I 488 138 501 142 2761 94 3128 109 235 66 298 84 
             
Site 2             
Wanasari I 254 112 265 124 1989 111 1986 124 59 26 200 93 
Talang Anyar 184 95 208 107 1258 99 1448 114 103 53 170 88 
Sub-total Site II 438 104 473 116 3247 106 3434 120 162 38 370 91 
             
Total 926 121 974 129 6008 100 6562 114 397 52 668 88 
Note:   I: Mid-term monitoring; II: Final monitoring 
At Site 1 (Talang Harapan and Talang Kuningan), two farmers failed to construct ridging (72.2 
percent and 76.5 percent, respectively) and two others failed to build sediment pits (75.8 percent and 
76.8 percent, respectively); these farmers all came from Talang Harapan. Only 10 farmers, or half of 
them, successfully planted the vegetative (grass) strip. They chose the right types of grass (local names: 
Satria Lampung and Gagajahan). These grasses were suitable for fodder and for terrace construction.  
The farmers‘ cited the same reasons they gave during the mid-term evaluation for failing to 
plant grass strips; it was hard to find grass seedlings and to plant during the dry season, they were busy 
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with other non-farming activities, and the construction of ridging and sediment pits were the priorities. 
By contrast, all the farmers in Talang Kuningan accomplished the contracted activities, including the 
grass planting. We later found out that because most of the farmers raised livestock (goats), they 
planted grass for fodder as well as for conservation. Farmers in Talang Harapan may need to be 
motivated in the drive to make them responsible for planting strip grass as this planting is, after all, still 
a new conservation approach for farmers in Sumberjaya. Nine farmers from Site 1 (47 percent out of 19 
farmers) failed the criteria during the final monitoring and evaluation.   
All the farmers at Site 2 constructed the ridging. One farmer accomplished only 74 percent of 
the contacted agreement on ridging, but he was rated as having passed the contract because most of his 
land was located on very steep slopes. One farmer failed to construct the correct number of sediment 
pits (only 26 percent accomplishment). Five farmers were not successful at planting grass strips. In 
total, five farmers from Site 2 (36 percent out of 14 farmers) did not accomplish their contracts.   
In summary, 19 out of 34 farmers successfully accomplished their contracts. This translates to 
55 percent accomplishment between the two sites. Fourteen farmers did not pass the final evaluation 
and one farmer failed at the mid-term evaluation. Most of the farmers failed to plant the grass strips, 
although many of them constructed both ridging and sediment pits, and some farmers even exceeding 
the contractual agreement. We decided that, finally, the percentage of accomplishment would not be 
calculated cumulatively. We did not add up all the percentages but evaluated them individually. 
Therefore, farmers who failed one of the contracted components were considered to have failed and did 
not receive the final payment. Although the rate of accomplishment could be categorized as low, we 
could not conclude that the overall conservation effort was unsuccessful. Table 22 shows that the rate 
of accomplishment was more than 80 percent for all contracted techniques: ridging (128 percent), 
sediment pits (114 percent), and grass strips (88 percent).  
Each talang (hamlet) of the two sites had different rates of success in accomplishing their 
contracts. At Site 1, all the farmers (100 percent) in Talang Kuningan fulfilled their contractual 
agreements, while in Talang Harapan, no farmer received the final payment. The rate of success at Site 
2 was higher (67 percent) and well-distributed at each talang compared with Site 1, which had a 
success rate of 47 percent.  
 
Table 22. Rate of Contract Accomplishment 
 Total number of 
farmers 
Number of failed 
farmers 
Rate of success (%) 
Site 1 19 10 47 
Talang Kuningan 9 0 100 
Talang Harapan 10 10 0 
Site 2 15 6 67 
Wanasari I 10 4 70 




The contractual arrangements between the two sites were different. At Site 1, two farmer groups 
(one from each talang) signed the contracts. The members arranged working in rotation, shifting from 
one plot to another until all the contracted activities were finalized. At Site 2, farmers signed the 
contract individually with ICRAF. In other words, there were two contracts at Site 1 and 15 contracts at 
Site 2. Obviously, these different contractual arrangements and institutions influenced the rate of 
success of each talang.  
In the exit interviews most of the Talang Harapan farmers cited a lack of leadership and a lack 
of coordination as the major reasons why their group was not motivated to perform well. The field 
assistant observed that the group did not choose the leader voluntarily, and the group leader was not an 
active community member. They also lacked time because of other activities, such as harvesting coffee, 
working in rice fields, working in other gardens, engaging as daily laborers, and renting motorbikes. 
They also cited unsuitable weather. In reality, many of the other farmers easily found grass seeds to 
plant and were able to fully accomplish their conservation activities during the current weather. 
However, most of the farmers felt that they could not accomplish the contract at the sixth-month point 
because this coincided with coffee harvesting. Some of them also assumed that getting a low score at 
the mid-term evaluation would influence the final result, hence lowering their enthusiasm for finishing 
the contract.     
The farmers suggested some improvements to increase the conservation program‘s rate of 
success. At least six farmers proposed having individual contracts rather than a group contract because 
weak coordination between members could make the whole group fail. They also suggested that some 
contract components should be more flexible. Most of the farmers agreed that there should be sanctions 
and that the current sanction was suitable. None of the farmers had a problem with the design of the 
auction and the contractual agreement. An analysis found that that there was no reliable difference 
between farmers who fully complied with the contract and those who failed when conservation 
awareness level, understanding of the auction design (rules, complexity), information quality, and the 
level of satisfaction was taken into account (Table 23).   
 
Table 23. Comparing Farmers who Complied and did not Comply with the Contracts 






Fisher‘s exact test  
P-value 
Understanding of the auction rules    0.790 
Not understand at all   
Moderately understand 3 (0.20) 5 (0.26) 
Quite understand 4 (0.27) 6 (0.32) 
Understand 2 (0.13) 1 (0.05) 
Very understand 4 (0.27) 7 (0.37) 
Easiness of the rules   1.00 
Very difficult - (0.00) 1 (0.05) 
Difficult 6 (0.40) 8 (0.42) 
Quite easy 5 (0.33) 5 (0.26) 
Easy  3 (0.20) 4 (0.21) 
Very easy 1 (0.07) 1 (0.05) 
Competitiveness of the auction   1.00 
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Aware 4 (0.27) 4 (0.21) (0.506) 
Not aware 11 (0.73) 15 (0.79) 
Awareness of soil and water conservation    0.354 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 0 (0.00) 1 (0.05) 
Quite good 5 (0.33) 11 (0.58) 
Good  7 (0.47) 5 (0.26) 
Very good 3 (0.20) 2 (0.11) 
Quality of the information provided by 
facilitators during the auction 
  0.803 
Very bad - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Bad 2 (0.13) 2 (0.11) 
Quite good 6 (0.40) 11 (0.58) 
Good  6 (0.40) 5 (0.26) 
Very good 1 (0.07) 1 (0.05) 
Completeness of information provided   0.347 
Very unsatisfying 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Unsatisfying 0 (0.00) 1 (0.05) 
Quite satisfying 7 (0.47) 11 (0.58) 
Satisfying 6 (0.40) 7 (0.37) 
Not satisfying 2 (0.13)  0 (0.00) 
 
3.8 Effect of Contract Implementation on Sedimentation Reduction 
The conservation activities were conducted in two sub-watersheds: Way Ringkih (Site 1: 
Talang Harapan and Talang Kuningan) and Way Lirikan (Site 2: Wanasari 1 and Talang Anyar). The 
field researchers took water samples three times a year: June, November, and December 2007, at three 
observation points located at the final outlet of the Way Ringkih and Way Lirikan River, before it 
enters the Way Besai, and at the end of Talang Kuningan stream before it flows into Way Ringkih. At 
the first two points, the sedimentation data for 2005 was available for comparison. 
The effect of a one-year contractual agreement to reduce river sedimentation fluctuated. In Way 
Ringkih the sedimentation rate at the beginning of December 2007 was higher, then became lower, at 
the end of December 2007 compared with the rates from 2005 to mid-2007. In Way Lirikan, the 
sedimentation rate in December 2007 was consistently lower than the rates in 2005 to mid-2007. In 
general, compared to the sedimentation rate calculated from 2005 to mid-2007, the sedimentation rate 
at the end of the contract (December 2007) was likely to be lower at both sub-watersheds. In Way 
Lirikan, the decrease of the rate of erosion was lower than in Way Ringkih because River Care program 
activities were already being carried out in the area during roughly the same period. River Care is a 
collective action to reduce sedimentation that includes repairing the riverbank, compacting dirt paths, 
dredging river mud and building small dams to retain erosion.  
The conservation activities of the conservation auction project, however, are not the main 
factors in decreasing sedimentation rates – the scale of conserved land under the contract was too 
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small, covering only 25 hectares, and the one-year contract period was too short. It takes between 10 
and 50 years for real erosion reduction to take place at watershed scale15. Living and dead plant 
biomass, vegetative cover, soil structure and the amount of rainfall are just some of the factors that can 
influence erosion (Verbist, 2008; Pimentel et al., 1995).  
                                                 
 
15 Dillaha, T. 2007. Monitoring Changes in Hydrologic Response due to Land Management Changes at the Watershed Scale: 
Time Lag and Other Issues. Presented at the Global Event on Payment/Reward for Environmental Services, Mataram, Indonesia, 22-27 
January 2007.  
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4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the outcomes from the laboratory and field experiments and theoretical considerations, 
the design of this auction was a sealed bid auction with budget constraints, the random tie-rule, the 
uniform pricing rule, minimized collusion, the announced ID numbers of provisional winners and an 
announced number of rounds. The auction followed a fairly standard format, with a single buyer and 
multiple sellers submitting sealed bids representing their willingness to accept the soil conservation 
contract for their plot. Bids were assessed according to a per-hectare price and the cut-off price was 
determined by a pre-set budget constraint. 
Our auction design considered choosing the uniform price rule for equity reasons. Literature on 
auction design has argued that uniform pricing is more likely to reveal farmers‘ true opportunity cost 
because bidders only determine the chance of winning. However, uniform pricing is relatively cost-
ineffective compared to the discriminative price rule. We analyzed some factors in choosing the 
uniform price rule, such as bidding strategy, transaction cost, fairness, political interests, the efficiency 
of ES buyers, the effect of risk aversion, and the effort of over-bidding.  
The auction was a multiple round auction consisting of eight rounds with a final binding round. 
The benefit of multiple rounds was that farmers learned from each round of the auction. However, the 
announced last round may introduce forms of strategic behavior. Concealing the number of rounds 
makes participants more uncertain because they use their own subjective probability distribution about 
the chance of being in the last round. By announcing the last round, we combined the benefits of the 
farmers‘ learning via the previous rounds and the advantages of a one-shot auction for the last round.  
The bids submitted by farmers were independent of farmers‘ observable factors. The analysis 
shows that farmers‘ learning during the auction process had a positive influence on their winning 
frequency. Levels of farmers‘ understanding of the auction mechanism were satisfying and farmers did 
understand the nature of competitiveness and budget limitations during the auction. The participants 
considered the auction mechanism to be fair. The farmers who had the greatest understanding of the 
auction were aware of competition between participants and thought that the auction was not 
complicated – these farmers tended to win the auction. From a social perspective, the auction and 
conservation contract with cash payment did not have any negative effects on relationships between 
community members. In conclusion, we interpret that the design is acceptable and doable for rural 
setting in developing countries.  
Finally, the rate of accomplishment was moderate. There were various reasons for this, ranging 
from a lack of leadership and coordination between members of the farmer‘s groups, to the difficulty of 
finding grass seedlings, to a conservation activity‘s clash with coffee harvesting time. In this specific 
case, private contracts tend to be more successful than a collective contract where leadership is lacking 
or there is no ‗champion‘ amongst the community members. Institutional factors and contract 
flexibility sometimes influences the accomplishment of conservation efforts. Our analysis showed that 
there were no significant differences in levels of understanding, complexity, competitiveness, and 
conservation awareness between farmers who complied with the conservation contracts and those who 
did not comply.  
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The limitation of this study is that we treated all the units of our pilot site as homogeneous, rather 
than heterogeneous, in their contribution to erosion and downstream sedimentation. These sites‘ 
contribution to environmental services was also heterogeneous and tied to hydrological and 
geophysical factors that are unlikely to be correlated to cost. The emphasis at the pilot stage was to 
assess the feasibility of the approach and to understand the drivers of the willingness to accept. Hence, 
we recommend in future researches a scoring rule that would give higher values to plots that contribute 
more to downstream problems. For instance, plots that are more steeply sloped and closer to rivers and 
streams can be assigned higher values to enhance the cost effectiveness of a larger scale auction. The 
simplifications in the pilot auction were deemed appropriate for the research and valuation intentions of 
the study. For a larger scale allocation auction, modifications like using a supply curve resulting from 
this procurement auction would be more appropriate. Any valuation information provides a reasonable 
platform for designing a scaled-up fixed payment scheme, including differential rates and eligibility 
rules necessary for targeting participants.  
The design of experimental auctions should fit the purpose of the overall objectives of a 
conservation program. In this case our design challenge was a fair auction design for farmers with low 
levels of formal education who are prone to social conflicts and are influenced by the power structure 
within their community. Some potential further analysis of the auction and conservation contract design 
could include comparing farmers‘ behavior under the hypothetical framed and real natural field 
experiment, analyzing factors contributing to contract compliance and farmers‘ adaptation to 
conservation, and the efficiency of the auction compared to other methods for ES budget allocation.    
The research team performed the monitoring of actual sediment loads to evaluate the 
environmental effectiveness of the approach, though payments did not depend on the final outcomes 
but on compliance with the proxies. As expected, due to the small plot size and limited time, the effect 
of contract implementation on river sedimentation was fluctuant. In general, compared to the 
sedimentation rate calculated from 2005 to mid-2007, the sedimentation rate at the end of the contract 
(December 2007) was likely to be lower at both sub-watersheds. The best conditionality in performing 
a PES scheme in theory should be based on environmental outcomes, such as the sedimentation 
reduction rate. However, the program designers and relevant stakeholders, including environmental 
service buyers and policy makers, should consider the scale of the project and the time lags and 
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